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Abstract 
This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate corporate 
governance. In the first chapter, we examine the effectiveness of board 
monitoring on CEOs. It is widely believed that outsider boards are better monitors.  
In fact, regulations now require that the board of directors of publicly traded firms 
be composed of a majority of independent directors (or outsiders).  However, this 
paper documents that an insider-dominated board can monitor the CEO just as 
well as an outsider board can when the firm’s CEO is hired from outside.  The 
results suggest that what matters is not so much as the structure of the board, 
but the “independence” between the board and the CEO it monitors.  Specifically, 
we find that insider boards monitor more of their firms’ CEOs if the CEO is hired 
from outside than from within.  In addition, outsider boards monitor both inside 
and outside CEOs the same way.  We also find little difference between insider 
and outsider boards when they monitor outside CEOs.  The main contribution of 
this paper is to show that an insider board can be an effective monitor as long as 
it is independent of the CEO.  In other words, what is important is board 
independence, not board structure per se.     
In chapter two, we examine the relation between the change in a firm’s 
value and its CEO selection sources: internal promotion versus external hire in 
both high and low product competition environments.  Our results show that firms 
v 
 
will be better off hiring an outside CEO (external hire) when the firms operate in a 
low product competition industry.  Specifically, the evidence shows that hiring an 
outside CEO for a firm in a low product competition industry will increase the 
firm’s value by about 3% for the entire tenure of the CEO.  The main contribution 
of this paper is to show that product market competition is an important factor in 
CEO selection. 
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Chapter 1 
Monitoring CEOs: Can Insider-dominated Boards Do a Good Job? 
1.1 Introduction 
Many studies suggest that better corporate governance leads to better 
firm performance (Core et al., 1999; Baek et al., 2004; Marciukaityte et al., 2006; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).  How do we improve corporate governance?  There is 
a large literature examining the factors that affect corporate governance.  It is 
widely believed that outsider boards are associated with better governance 
(Weisbach, 1988; Borokhovich et al., 1996; Cotter et al., 1997; Uzun et al., 2004; 
Marciukaityte et al., 2006).  On November 4, 2003, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) approved the revised listing standards proposed by the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) to require 
firms listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq to have a board composed of a majority of 
independent directors — with independent directors being those who are un-
affiliated with or outside the firm.  However, it is not obvious that firms are always 
better off with outsider boards because the board serves two distinct functions of 
monitoring and advising (Raheja, 2005; Coles et al., 2008; Harris and Raviv, 
2008; Linck et al., 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2009).  While a main function of 
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board of directors is to oversee top management, veto poor decisions, and in 
extreme situations, replace chief executive officers (CEOs) (Weisbach, 1988; 
Yermack, 1996; Uzun et al., 2004; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Paul, 2007), the 
board also plays an important function of advising, using the expertise and 
experience of directors to help the CEOs make better management decisions 
(Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). 
 If boards serve both advisory and monitoring functions, it is not clear that 
the monitoring function provided by boards should always be more important 
than advising for all firms.  Indeed, Klein (1998) argues that the CEO’s need for 
advice will increase with the complexity of the firm.  Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988), and Yermack (1996) suggest that CEOs of diversified firms have greater 
need for advice.  Inside directors play an important role on the board by providing 
information to outsiders (Jensen, 1993).  Also, inside directors possess more 
firm-specific knowledge (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Moreover, Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) suggest that a board’s advisory quality is positively related to the 
precision of the information provided by the CEO.  The CEO faces a tradeoff in 
sharing his information.  On one hand, he will likely get better advice if he shares 
more information.  On the other hand, the more information the board knows 
about the firm’s options, the greater the likelihood that it will interfere with the 
CEO’s decision.  As a result, CEOs may not communicate precise information 
with boards that are too independent.  Thus, here is the question that this paper 
addresses:  can a firm have an insider-dominated board whose members will 
have the necessary information for good advice and yet will still have the 
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incentive to monitor the CEO?  In this paper, we argue that if the CEO is hired 
from outside and thus has limited connection with inside directors, then an insider 
board will have the same incentive to monitor the CEO as will an outsider board.  
That is, we examine the relation between CEO selection sources – internal 
promotion vs. external hire – and the effective monitoring of CEOs by boards with 
different compositions of directors (outsider vs. insider boards). 
 There is a large literature that examines the relation between corporate 
governance and board characteristics.  The literature covers topics such as 
board independence (Weisback, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bhagat 
and Black, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Uzun et al., 2004), board quality 
(Jenter and Lewellen, 2010), stock ownership of board members (Denis and 
Sarin, 1999), board size (Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008; Coles et al., 2008), 
whether a board is a busy one 1(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), and whether the 
chairman and CEO positions are occupied by the same individuals (Brickley et al., 
1997; Goyal and Park, 2002).  Many of these studies have showed that a board 
with more outside directors is associated with more effective governance.  
Weisbach (1988) among others reports that companies with outsider-dominated 
boards have a higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance than 
companies with insider-dominated boards.  Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
reputation concerns and fear of lawsuits can motivate outside directors to 
represent the interests of shareholders if the directors are frequent players in the 
market for outside directorship.  Reputation concerns provide a strong incentive 
                                                          
1
 Busy boards are boards in which the majority of outside directors hold three or more 
directorships. 
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for outside directors to deliver effective corporate governance, enabling them to 
signal their quality to the market.  Thus, outside directors are expected to be the 
better monitor of the CEO. 
Most studies focus on identifying necessary board characteristics in order 
for firms to have better corporate governance.  Nevertheless, we can also 
mitigate agency problem by directly aligning the CEO’s incentive with the 
shareholders’.  One way to achieve this is through the design of CEO 
compensation. Indeed, the literature has showed that management 
compensation package and ownership influence firm performance by alleviating 
agency problem (Morck et al., 1988; Bosehem and Smith, 1995; Mehran, 1995).   
However, are there any characteristics of the CEO that will affect 
monitoring by the board of directors?  As the board that can have inside and 
outside directors, the CEO can also come from inside or outside of the firm.  
Inside CEOs are those who were an officer or an inside director of the hiring firm 
prior to their appointment, whereas outside CEOs are those who were not an 
officer or an inside director of the hiring firm prior to the appointment.  According 
to the definitions of inside and outside CEOs, clearly there must be significant 
connection between an inside CEO and the firm’s inside directors.  In contrast, 
outside CEOs are less likely to have much connection with either inside directors 
or outside directors.  Thus, because outside CEOs are not tied to either type of 
directors (inside or outside), they should experience the same level of monitoring 
regardless of the firm’s board composition.  Hwang and Kim (2009) show that 
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when a firm’s CEO and its board of directors are less socially tied,2 the board 
provides better oversight: there is a stronger sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance.  Similarly, when a firm has an insider-dominated board, it will 
monitor an outside CEO more rigorously than an inside CEO because of the lack 
of connection between members of the board and the outside CEO.  On the 
other hand, when a firm has an outsider-dominated board, it will monitor an 
inside or an outside CEO in the same way because neither is closely tied to the 
directors.   
We test two hypotheses using a sample of 363 CEO turnovers from 1998 
to 2004 and a control sample of 784 firm-year observations that do not change 
CEOs over the same period.  The first hypothesis is whether the probability of 
resignation due to prior performance of an outside CEO is higher than that of an 
inside CEO when the firm has an insider-dominated board.  That is, whether 
insider boards monitor outside CEOs more than they monitor inside CEOs?  The 
second hypothesis is whether there is a difference in the probability of CEO 
turnover due to prior performance between an outsider-dominated board and an 
insider-dominated board when the firm has an outside CEO.  In other words, do 
outsider boards monitor outside CEOs more than do insider boards?  Our results 
show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly 
higher between an insider board and an outside CEO than between an insider 
board and an inside CEO.  This suggests that insider boards monitor outside 
                                                          
2
 Social ties are informal relationships built by sharing similar experiences that facilitate 
interactions and thereby foster personal connections.  People enjoy an easier mutual 
understanding and are more comfortable with others who share similar characteristics and 
experiences [Mcpherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)]. 
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CEOs more than they monitor inside CEOs.  In addition, the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance is the same between an inside CEO and an outside 
CEO when the firm has an outsider board.  We also find that the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to firm performance is the same between an insider board and an 
outsider board when the firm has an outside CEO.  Thus, there is no difference 
between an insider and an outsider board when it monitors an outside CEO.  
Therefore, as far as board oversight is concerned, what matters is the 
independence of the board from the CEO rather than a particular board structure.  
In this regard, if a firm is better off with an insider board, it can choose to hire an 
outside CEO because the insider board will be as effective in monitoring the 
outside CEO.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we 
summarize the relevant literature and develop the hypotheses.  In section 3, we 
describe our data sources and variables used in the analysis.  The empirical 
findings are presented in section 4.  Section 5 concludes.  
1.2 Relevant Literature and Hypothesis Development  
1.2.1 Agency Problem 
One of the most challenging issues that the firm is facing today is the 
agency problem between shareholders and management.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that zero or partial ownership of firm managers cause them to work 
less vigorously and pursue personal benefits because shareholders bear most of 
7 
 
the costs.  Besides pecuniary benefits, managers will also pursue non-pecuniary 
benefits at the cost of shareholders.  Managers enjoy power and prestige 
associated with their positions, and this can lead to over-expanding firm size 
(empire building).  Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that managers prefer 
continuation of the firm to keep their control rents even if liquidation would be 
better for shareholders.  
1.2.2 Mitigate Agency Problem through board monitoring  
To mitigate agency problem, recent studies have focused on the 
monitoring function of the board of directors.  Scholars have attempted to identify 
the characteristics of the board that would improve corporate governance.  
Evidence suggests that outsider boards are better monitors.  Weisbach (1988) 
reports a higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior firm performance for 
companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insider 
boards.  Uzun et al. (2004) use a broad definition of fraud, including regulatory 
violations and frauds of stakeholders and financial reporting, to find that as the 
number of independent outside director increases in the board and in its audit 
and compensation committees, the likelihood that the firm will commit fraud 
decreases.  Jenter and Lewellen (2010) show that the turnover-performance 
sensitivity increases substantially with board quality, including board 
independence.   
However, firms are not always better off with outsider boards.  Coles et al. 
(2008) find that R&D-intensive firms, for which the firm-specific knowledge of 
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inside directors is clearly important, have a higher firm value when the fraction of 
inside directors increases.  Masulis and Mobbs (2009) find that inside directors 
with outside directorships are associated with better firm operating performance 
and higher market-to-book ratios.  Inside directors are also associated with better 
board decision making, as evident in their firms’ better acquisition decisions, 
large holdings of liquid assets, lower likelihood of overstating earnings and more 
positive seasoned equity offering announcement effects. 
Firm characteristics are also important to its board structure.  For example, 
Raheja (2005) shows that optimal board composition is a function of the firm’s 
characteristics such as the industry that the firm operates in.  Harris and Raviv 
(2008) show that when insiders have important information, having an outsider 
board can result in a loss of information that is more costly than the agency cost 
associated with insider boards.  Linck et al. (2008) find empirical evidence that 
board structure across firms is consistent with the cost and benefit tradeoff of the 
board’s monitoring and advising roles.   
Board size is another important factor.  There is some evidence indicating 
that small boards are better monitors.  Yermack (1996) finds an inverse 
association between board size and firm value in a sample of large US industrial 
corporations.  Furthermore, Eisenberg et al. (1998) find a significant negative 
correlation between board size and profitability in a sample of small and midsize 
Finnish firms.  However, Coles et al. (2008) shows that complex firms, which 
have greater advising requirements than simple firms, have large boards, and 
Tobin’s q increases in board size for complex firms.  Also, Cheng (2008) provides 
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empirical evidence that firms with larger boards have lower variability of 
corporate performance.  The results are consistent with the view that it takes 
more compromises for a larger board to reach consensus, and consequently, 
decisions of larger boards are less extreme, leading to less variable corporate 
performance.   
There is also evidence indicating that less-busy boards are better monitors.  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) document that firms with busy boards are associated 
with weak corporate governance --- a low sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance.  They also show that departures of busy outside directors tend to 
generate positive abnormal returns, while companies with new busy outside 
directors experience negative abnormal returns.  Moreover, Vafeas (1999) finds 
that the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value, which 
implies that boards with fewer annual meetings are better monitors.   
All these studies have attempted to identify board characteristics that help 
to improve corporate governance assuming that all CEOs are the same.  In other 
words, when examining the effects of board monitoring, they did not consider that 
CEOs are different based on their affiliation with their firms.  We believe that the 
affiliation level can influence the way that the board monitors the CEO.  Thus, in 
this paper, we examine the probability of CEO turnover due to prior performance 
not only under different board structures (insider or outsider boards), but also 
under different CEO affiliations (inside or outside CEOs).  
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1.2.3 Hypothesis development 
Our analysis is closely related to studies that investigate the relation 
between board characteristics and CEOs.  Borokhovich et al. (1996) show a 
strong positive relation between the percentage of outside directors and the 
frequency of outside CEO succession.  Thus, the probability that a firm will hire 
an outside CEO increases with the percentage of outside directors on the board.  
Parrino (1997) also finds that it is more likely for a board to fire the CEO with 
poor performance, and to hire a new CEO externally when there are more similar 
firms in an industry.  Huson et al. (2001) document that during their 1971 to 1994 
sample period, boards fired CEOs and hired outside CEOs more frequently, but 
the turnover-performance sensitivity did not change significantly.  None of these 
studies, however, has categorized both the board members and the CEOs into 
inside and outside groups, and examined whether there is any difference in 
board monitoring after the appointment of an inside or an outside CEO.   
As mentioned, firms generally have two types of CEOs, inside and outside 
CEOs.  Unlike inside CEOs, who were an officer or an inside director of the hiring 
firm prior to their appointment, outside CEOs had no affiliation with the hiring firm 
prior to their appointment.  Because an inside CEO was an officer or an inside 
director of the hiring firm, he/she has established certain relationships with inside 
directors of the firm.  McPherson et al. (2001) assert that similarities between 
people such as work and membership foster connections.  People have an 
easier mutual understanding and are more comfortable with others who share 
similar characteristics and experiences.  Thus, inside directors might be more 
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friendly to inside CEOs due to these connections.  In contrast, inside directors 
would have incentive to monitor outside CEOs because outside CEOs do not 
have such connections.  Likewise, outside directors would monitor both inside 
and outside CEOs in the same way since outside directors do not have 
connections with either.  Thus, outside CEOs should experience the same level 
of monitoring regardless of the firm’s board composition (inside or outside).   
In summary, we propose the following hypotheses.  The sensitivity of an 
outside CEO’s turnover to prior firm performance should be higher than that of an 
inside CEO for companies with insider-dominated boards.  In addition, the 
sensitivity of an outside CEO’s turnover to prior firm performance under an 
insider-dominated board should be similar to the sensitivity of an outside CEO’s 
turnover to prior firm performance under an outsider-dominated board. 
 
I. For firms with insider-dominated boards, the probability of 
resignation of an outside CEO due to prior performance is higher 
than that of an inside CEO. 
 
II.  When firms have outside CEOs, the probability of resignation of 
the CEO due to prior performance is higher under an outsider-
dominated board than under an insider-dominated board. 
12 
 
1.3 Data and Variables 
We identify the CEO turnover sample from ExecuComp database over the 
period from 1998 to 2004.  We obtain CEO age, tenure, ownership, duality, and 
the information on board members from ExecuComp, proxy statements, 10-K 
reports, and Edgar data retrieval system.  Stock market data is obtained from the 
University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  Mergers 
and acquisitions data is obtained from Security Data Corporation (SDC).  We 
exclude firms where the CEO turnover event is due to promotion, retirement, 
death, or merger and acquisition according to LexisNexis database and SDC.  
However, CEO turnovers with an unknown reason are included in the sample.  
Our final sample includes 363 CEO turnovers from 1998 to 2004.  We also 
construct a control sample of firms from ExecuComp that do not experience any 
CEO turnover during the period 1998 to 2004.  The control firms meet the same 
data requirements as the firms in the CEO turnover sample and are included in 
the analysis only for the years in which they have complete data.  In total, we 
have a control sample of 784 firm-year observations that do not change CEOs 
over the same period.  The performance measure is the market-adjusted stock 
returns estimated as the stock return minus the return on the equally-weighted 
portfolio of all CRSP firms accumulated over the 12-month period immediately 
preceding the CEO turnover month.  The measure of outside domination of the 
board is the fraction of board members who are outsiders following Weisbach 
(1988).  All firms in which the percentage of outsiders is no more than 40% of the 
directors are considered insider-dominated firms.   All firms in which the 
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percentage of outsiders is at least 60% of the board are classified as outsider-
dominated firms, and all firms with a percentage of outsiders between 40% and 
60% are considered to be grey boards.  CEOs are categorized into two groups; 
inside or outside CEOs.  Inside CEOs are those who were an officer or an inside 
director of the hiring firm prior to their appointment, whereas outside CEOs are 
those who were not an officer or an inside director of the hiring firm prior to their 
appointment.      
To test whether boards monitor inside CEOs and outside CEOs differently 
and to compare the sizes of the effects across board types, we relate CEO 
resignations to performance measure.  We test the hypotheses using logit 
models to estimate the probability of a CEO change.  The complete logistic 
model is as follows: 
 
 Pr (CEO leaves his job) = α + β₁ * R + β₂ * R * Dinside + β3 * R * Doutside 
+ β₄ * R * Dinside * Doutside_CEO + β₅ * R * Doutside * Doutside_CEO + δ₁ * Dinside 
 + δ₂ * Doutside + δ₃ * Doutside_CEO + δ₄ * (CEO_chair) + δ₅*(CEO age) 
 
 
+ δ₆ * (CEO tenure)
 
+ δ₇ * (CEO ownership) + ε                       (1)                                         
 
The dependent variable in equation (1) is equal to 1 if there is a CEO 
change in a given month and 0 otherwise.  R is the annual return on the 
company’s stock prior to the month of resignation minus the return on an equally-
weighted market portfolio.  The logit equations are estimated using firm-months 
as the unit of observation and the return for the year prior to the month of 
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resignation as the performance measure in order to minimize the time between 
the performance period and the resignation.  Dinside is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the company has an insider-dominated board and 0 otherwise.  
Similarly, Doutside is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company has an 
outsider-dominated board and 0 otherwise.  Doutside_CEO is a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 if the company has an outside CEO and 0 otherwise.  CEO_chair is 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
and 0 otherwise.  Other control variables include CEO age, tenure, and 
ownership of the firm.  The detailed definitions of all variables are shown in Table 
1.1. 
Based on our discussion, we expect the following signs.  First, we expect 
the coefficient of annual return (β₁ in equation (1)) to be negative and 
significantly different from zero, indicating that a poor prior performance 
increases the probability of a CEO’s resignation.  Second, for an outside CEO to 
have a higher probability of resignation than that of an inside CEO for firms with 
insider-dominated boards (hypothesis I), we expect the coefficient of the 
interactive term for annual return, the dummy variable for board characteristics 
Dinside , and the dummy variable for CEO characteristics Doutside_CEO (β₄ in 
equation (1)) to be negative and significantly different from zero.  Third, the 
necessary condition for an outside CEO under an outsider-dominated board to 
have a higher probability of resignation due to prior performance than that of an 
outside CEO under an insider-dominated board (hypothesis II), β3 and β₅ are 
required to be jointly significant.  Also, if β₂ and β₄ are jointly significant, then  
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	
				
 , where z = α + (β₁ * R) + (β3 * R) + (β₅ * R) + δ₂ + δ₃ + (δ₄ * CEO_chair) + 
(δ₅ * CEO age) + (δ₆ * CEO tenure)
 
 + (δ₇ * CEO ownership)  from equation (1) 
should be larger than   
	
				
 , where z = α + (β₁ * R) + (β₂ * R) + (β₄ * R) + δ₁ + 
δ₃ + (δ₄ * CEO_chair) + (δ₅ * CEO age) + (δ₆ * CEO tenure) + (δ₇ * CEO 
ownership) from equation (1).  This is to compare the marginal effect of 
monitoring between an outsider board and an insider board given an outside 
CEO.    
 
1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1.2 describes the mean, median, standard deviation, 5th percentile, 
and 95th percentile of the performance measure, insider board dummy variable, 
outsider board dummy variable, outside CEO dummy variable, and other control 
variables for the CEO turnover sample and the control sample.  The mean of the 
outside CEO dummy is 0.44 for the CEO turnover sample and 0.43 for the 
control sample.  The median values of this dummy variable are 0 for both 
samples.  Table 1.2 also shows that firms with CEO turnover perform poorly 
compared with the control firms that experience no turnover.  The mean and 
median of the market-adjusted stock returns for the CEO turnover sample are -
16 
 
11.1% and -12.4%, while the mean and median of the market-adjusted stock 
returns for the control sample are 6.3% and 2.7%.   
CEOs in the turnover sample have shorter tenure.  They are at about the 
same age as the CEOs in the control sample.  Because CEO turnovers with an 
unknown reason are also included in the sample, it is possible that the turnover 
sample might include some routine retirement-related turnover at age 65 (Mruphy 
and Zimmerman, 1993).  To control for this effect, we include in the multivariate 
tests a dummy variable for CEOs whose age is between 63 and 65. 
Table 1.3 shows the distributions of inside and outside CEOs under 
insider board, outsider board, and grey board.  Boards in which the percentage of 
outsiders is no more than 40% of the directors are considered to be insider 
boards.   Boards in which the percentage of outsiders is at least 60% of the 
directors are classified as outsider boards.  All boards with a percentage of 
outsiders between 40% and 60% are termed grey boards.  According to these 
classifications, the combined sample has 56 inside CEOs (54.9%) and 46 outside 
CEOs (45.1%) under insider board, 465 inside CEOs (57.8%) and 339 outside 
CEOs (42.2%) under outsider board, and 124 inside CEOs (51.4%) and 117 
outside CEOs (48.6%) under grey board.  The distributions of inside and outside 
CEOs under all three different types of board structures are similar.   
Table 1.4 presents Pearson correlations between independent variables 
included in the regression tests.  Except for the correlation between outside 
board dummy and inside board dummy, and the correlation between CEO 
ownership and CEO tenure, most other correlations are small in magnitude (the 
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absolute correlation coefficients are not higher than 0.3).  This suggests that 
multicollinearity is not likely to pose a serious problem in the multivariate analysis.  
1.4.2 Turnover sensitivities of CEOs under different board structures 
Table 1.5 reports the results of logit models that predict the probability of 
CEO turnover.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one for the CEO turnover firms and a value of zero for the control firms.  
Independent variables include market-adjusted stock returns, inside board 
dummy (equal to 1 if the firm has an inside board and 0 otherwise), outside board 
dummy (equal to 1 if the firm has an outside board and 0 otherwise), outside 
CEO dummy (equal to 1 if the firm has an outside CEO and 0 otherwise), CEO-
chairman dummy (equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise), CEO age dummy for the CEO age of 63 to 65, CEO tenure, CEO 
ownership, and interaction terms as specified in equation (1).   
The first column of Table 1.5 shows that the coefficient on the return 
variable is negative and significantly different from zero.  This means that a poor 
stock performance increases the probability of a CEO’s losing his job.  This result 
replicates the result of Weisback (1988).   
The second column of Table 1.5 examines the effect of stock returns on 
turnover across different board and CEO types.  The coefficient of the interaction 
term consisted of return, inside board dummy, and outside CEO dummy is 
negative and statistically significant.  This indicates that (hypothesis I) cannot be 
rejected.  Note that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term consisted of 
18 
 
return, inside board dummy, and outside CEO dummy is consistently negative 
and significant for all logit models in table 1.5.  This means that for firms with 
insider-dominated boards, the probability of resignation due to prior performance 
of an outside CEO is higher than that of an inside CEO.  The necessary condition 
for hypothesis II to be true is to have two coefficients to be jointly significant.  The 
first one is the coefficient on the interaction term consisted of return and outside 
board dummy (β3 in equation (1)), and the second one is the coefficient of the 
interaction term consisted of return, outside board dummy, and outside CEO 
dummy (β₅ in equation (1)).  The first thing we can see about these two 
coefficients is that they are both individually insignificant.  Also, according to the 
Wald test result of a significance level of 56.9%, we can conclude that the above 
two coefficients are jointly insignificant.  This means that (hypothesis II) is 
rejected.  Note that the Wald test results are similar for all logit models in table 
1.5.  Therefore, outsider boards do not monitor outside CEOs more than do 
insider boards.       
The third column of Table 1.5 includes a dummy variable for whether the 
CEO age between 63 and 65, while the final column includes CEO-chairman 
dummy, CEO age dummy, CEO tenure, CEO ownership as control variables.  
The results of the third and the final columns are similar to those of the second 
column.  The final column of table 1.5 shows that the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term consisted of return, inside board dummy, and outside CEO 
dummy (β₄ in equation (1)) is -1.519 and significant at the 5% level.  The 
corrected interaction effect of β₄ is -0.844 and significant at the 10% level based 
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on Ai and Norton (2003).  This suggests that insider boards indeed monitor 
outside CEOs more than they monitor inside CEOs.  In addition, the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term consisted of return and outside board dummy, 
and the interaction term consisted of return, outside board dummy, and outside 
CEO dummy are both individually insignificant.  Also, according to the Wald test 
result of a significance level of 40.2%, the above two coefficients are still jointly 
insignificant.  Again, this suggests that outsider boards do not monitor outside 
CEOs more than do insider boards.   
Table 1.5 also reports that the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables are generally in the predicted direction.  Note that the estimated 
coefficient on CEO tenure is negative and significant, suggesting that CEO 
turnover is less likely when CEOs have longer tenure.  The estimated coefficient 
on CEO_chair dummy is negative, suggesting a decline in the likelihood of CEO 
turnover when the CEO is also the chairman of the board.  The estimated 
coefficient on CEO ownership is negative.  This means that when CEOs own 
more shares of their firms, the likelihood of CEO turnover will decline.           
1.4.3 Robustness checks 
Table 1.6 presents logit results for the sample of only forced CEO 
turnovers and the same control sample.  We exclude all turnovers that are due to 
promotion, retirement, death, mergers and acquisitions, and unknown reasons 
according to LexisNexis database and SDC.  The combined sample has 123 
CEO turnovers and 784 no CEO turnover observations.  The distributions of 
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inside and outside CEOs under insider board, outsider board, and grey board are 
still about equally distributed and are similar to the results in Table 1.3.   
The final column of Table 1.6 shows that the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term consisted of return, inside board dummy, and outside CEO 
dummy is      -3.206 and significant at the 1% level.  The corrected interaction 
effect of β₄ is -1.684 and significant at the 5% level based on Ai and Norton 
(2003).  This result is stronger than the result in Table 1.5 and suggests that 
insider boards monitor outside CEOs more than they monitor inside CEOs.  In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term consisted of return and 
outside board dummy, and the interaction term consisted of return, outside board 
dummy, and outside CEO dummy are both individually insignificant.  Also, 
according to the Wald test result of a significance level of 68.4%, the above two 
coefficients are jointly insignificant.  Again, this suggests that outsider boards do 
not monitor outside CEOs more than do insider boards.  The signs and 
significance of the control variables are consistent with those reported in Table 
1.5. 
We also examine if the results are robust to different performance 
measures.  Table 1.7 presents logit results based on the 2-year market-adjusted 
returns prior to the months of the observations.3  The final column of Table 1.7 
shows that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term consisted of return, 
inside board dummy, and outside CEO dummy is -0.987 and significant at the 
10% level.  The corrected interaction effect of β₄ is -0.256 based on Ai and 
                                                          
3
 We also examine the results of Table 1.5 by using the 3-year market-adjusted returns prior to the months 
of the observations. The results are similar with those reported in Table 1.5. 
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Norton (2003).  This result suggests that insider boards monitor outside CEOs 
more than they monitor inside CEOs.  In addition, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term consisted of return and outside board dummy, and the 
interaction term consisted of return, outside board dummy, and outside CEO 
dummy are both individually insignificant.  Also, according to the Wald test result 
of a significance level of 53.4%, the above two coefficients are jointly insignificant.  
Again, this suggests that outsider boards do not monitor outside CEOs more than 
do insider boards.  The signs and significance of the control variables are 
consistent with those reported in Table 1.5. 
  Table 1.8 presents logit results based on Fama-French four-factor risk-
adjusted returns prior to the months of the observations.  The final column of 
Table 1.8 shows that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term consisted of 
return, inside board dummy, and outside CEO dummy is -1.2 and significant at 
the 10% level.  The corrected interaction effect of β₄ is -0.103 based on Ai and 
Norton (2003).  This result suggests that insider boards monitor outside CEOs 
more than they monitor inside CEOs.  In addition, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term consisted of return and outside board dummy, and the 
interaction term consisted of return, outside board dummy, and outside CEO 
dummy are both individually insignificant.  Also, according to the Wald test result 
of a significance level of 47.2%, the above two coefficients are jointly insignificant.  
Again, this suggests that outsider boards do not monitor outside CEOs more than 
do insider boards.  The signs and significance of the control variables are 
consistent with those reported in Table 1.5. 
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We also find that outsider boards do not monitor inside and outside CEOs 
differently.  Table 1.9 reports the results of logit models that predict the 
probability of CEO turnover when monitored by an outsider board.  The final 
column of this table shows that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
consisted of return and outside CEO dummy is -0.514 but not significant.  The 
corrected interaction effect is -0.095 and also insignificant based on Ai and 
Norton (2003).  This result suggests that outsider boards do not monitor inside 
and outside CEOs differently.  The result is consistent with Fama and Jensen 
(1983) which argue that reputation concerns and fear of lawsuits can motivate 
outside directors to represent the interests of shareholders.   
1.5 Conclusions 
Do insider boards monitor outside CEOs more than they monitor inside 
CEOs?  And do outsider boards and insider boards monitor outside CEOs 
differently?  If board monitoring of CEO is more effective in certain firms, it is 
predicted that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is higher in 
those firms.  We find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is 
significantly higher between an insider board and an outside CEO than between 
an insider board and an inside CEO.  This suggests that insider boards monitor 
outside CEOs more than they monitor inside CEOs.  In addition, the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to firm performance is the same between an inside CEO and an 
outside CEO when the firm has an outsider board.  We also find that the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is the same between an insider 
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board and an outsider board when the firm has an outside CEO.  This suggests 
that there is no difference between insider and outsider board monitoring of 
outside CEOs.  Therefore, as far as board monitoring is concerned, what matters 
is the independence of the board from the CEO rather than the board structure 
itself.  Thus, if a firm is better off with an insider board, it can choose to hire an 
outside CEO because the insider board will be effective in monitoring the outside 
CEO.  Our results are robust to various measures of firm performance and to the 
exclusion of CEO turnovers with unknown reasons. 
  Our results have interesting implication.  If effective board monitoring is 
the reason of the revised listing standards approved by SEC to require 
companies listed on NYSE or Nasdaq to have a board that is composed of a 
majority of independent (or outsider) directors, we can provide more flexibility 
and choices to the listed firms.  For example, firms that will be better off with 
insider boards can choose to hire outside CEOs because monitoring effects on 
outside CEOs are the same regardless of board types.  Indeed, the main 
contribution of this paper is to show that an insider board can be an effective 
monitor as long as it is independent of the CEO, as when the CEO is hired from 
outside.       
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Table 1.1: Variable Definitions  
  
Variable Description Definition 
Panel A: Summary Statistics and Correlation Table Variables 
N Number of Firm Years The number of firm years.  
Pr (CEO 
turnover) 
Probability of CEO 
Turnover 
Binary variable equal to one if there is a CEO 
turnover and zero otherwise. 
R Market-adjusted Stock Returns 
12-month return on the company’s stock prior 
to the month of resignation minus the return 
on an equally-weighted market portfolio.  
Dinside Insider Board Binary variable equal to one if the firm has an insider board and zero otherwise. 
Doutside Outsider Board Binary variable equal to one if the firm has an outsider board and zero otherwise. 
Doutside_CEO Outside CEO Binary variable equal to one if the firm has an outside CEO and zero otherwise. 
CEO_chair CEO Durality Binary variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
CEO age CEO Age Age of the CEO during the event year. 
CEO 
tenure CEO Tenure 
The number of years the CEO had held the 
position as of the year of the turnover. 
CEO 
ownership CEO Ownership The fraction of shares owned by the CEO.  
Panel B:  Regression Dependent Variable 
Pr (CEO 
turnover) 
Probability of CEO 
Turnover 
Binary variable equal to one if there is a CEO 
turnover and zero otherwise. 
Panel C:  Regression Independent Variables 
R Market-adjusted Stock Returns 
12-month return on the company’s stock prior 
to the month of resignation minus the return 
on an equally-weighted market portfolio.  
Dinside Insider Board Binary variable equal to one if the firm has an insider board and zero otherwise. 
Doutside Outsider Board Binary variable equal to one if the firm has an outsider board and zero otherwise. 
Doutside_CEO Outside CEO Binary variable equal to one if the firm has an outside CEO and zero otherwise. 
CEO_chair CEO Durality Binary variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
CEO age CEO Age Binary variable equal to one if the CEO is 
aged 63-65 and zero otherwise. 
CEO 
tenure CEO Tenure 
The number of years the CEO had held the 
position as of the year of the turnover. 
CEO 
ownership CEO Ownership The fraction of shares owned by the CEO.  
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Firms with CEO Turnover 
Variable N Mean Median σ 5th  95th 
R 363 -0.11152 -0.12470 0.57492 -0.99254 0.84445 
Dinside 363 0.07989 0 0.27149 0 1 
Doutside 363 0.69146 1 0.46252 0 1 
Doutside_CEO 363 0.44904 0 0.49808 0 1 
CEO_chair 363 0.23141 0 0.42231 0 1 
CEO age 363 57.63085 58 9.04233 42 72 
CEO tenure 363 8.34435 7 7.61902 1 22 
CEO ownership 363 0.02082 0 0.05996 0 0.131 
Panel B: Firms without CEO Turnover 
R 784 0.06372 0.02756 0.52782 -0.6599 0.90774 
Dinside 784 0.09311 0 0.29077 0 1 
Doutside 784 0.70535 1 0.45617 0 1 
Doutside_CEO 784 0.43239 0 0.49572 0 1 
CEO_chair 784 0.25765 0 0.43762 0 1 
CEO age 784 57.66071 58 8.27803 43 71 
CEO tenure 784 12.36989 10 8.19359 3 31 
CEO ownership 784 0.03579 0.0022 0.07771 0 0.2374 
Descriptive statistics for firms that changed CEOs from 1998 through 2004 and for a control 
sample that did not change CEOs over the same period. Panel A uses a sample of 363 CEO 
turnovers, and Panel B uses a control sample of 784 firm-year observations. 
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Table 1.3: Frequency Table 
 
Inside CEO outside CEO Total 
Insider Board 56 46 102 
 
           (54.9%)         (45.1%)   
Outsider Board 465 339 804 
 (57.8%) (42.2%)  
Grey Board 124 117 241 
 (51.4%) (48.6%)  
Total 645 502 1147 
 (56.2%) (43.8%)  
The frequency of inside and outside CEO representation under 
insider board, outsider board, and grey board based on 1,147 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
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Table 1.4: Pearson Correlation 
  
 Dinside Doutside Doutside_CEO CEO_chair CEO age CEO tenure Ownership 
R -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.03      0.04 
Dinside     -0.47*** 0.00 0.04 -0.03       0.17***     0.12*** 
Doutside    -0.04* 0.01    0.06**      -0.13***    -0.30*** 
Doutside_CEO    -0.01    -0.04       0.26***     0.18*** 
CEO_chair      0.01 0.04      0.02 
CEO age            0.08***     -0.03 
CEO tenure       
         
0.38*** 
Correlations are based on 1,147 observations. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
  *  p<10%, **  p<5%, ***  p<1% 
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Table 1.5: Estimates of Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant -0.776*** -0.636*** -0.600*** 0.207 
 
   (-11.92) (-4.07) (-3.79) (1.09) 
   R -0.640*** -0.638** -0.634** -0.487** 
 (-4.38) (-2.5) (-2.51) (-2.20) 
Dinside  -0.349 -0.368 -0.173 
 
 (-1.27) (-1.33) (-0.61) 
Doutside  -0.181 -0.184 -0.304* 
 
 (-1.13) (-1.15) (-1.77) 
Doutside_CEO  0.033 0.027 0.314** 
 
 (0.26) (0.21) (2.19) 
CEO_chair    -0.070 
 
   (-0.45) 
CEO age   -0.280 -0.300 
 
  (-1.26) (-1.35) 
CEO tenure    -0.081*** 
 
   (-5.56) 
Ownership    -0.005 
 
   (-0.45) 
R * Dinside  1.035* 1.067* 0.867* 
 
 (1.74) (1.73) (1.74) 
R * Doutside  0.148 0.152 -0.024 
 
 (0.4) (0.42) (-0.07) 
R * Dinside *     -1.606** -1.653** -1.519** 
Doutside_CEO  (-2.03) (-2.03) (-2.06) 
R * Doutside *     -0.414 -0.430 -0.438 
Doutside_CEO  (1.05) (-1.09) (-1.12) 
Wald test 
(β3, β₅)     
Prob > chi2  0.569 0.545 0.402 
Log 
likelihood -699.52 -695.18 -694.32 -656.90 
R-squared 0.018 0.024 0.026 0.078 
Corrected Interaction Effect of β₄ on Model (4) based on Ai and Norton (2003)  
Interaction Term -0.844  
Z-Value -1.89  
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of pooled logit analysis of CEO turnover regressed on 
performance measure, interactive terms between performance measure and board 
dummy variables, interactive terms between performance measure and outside 
CEO dummy variable, and other control variables for a sample of 363 CEO 
changes and 784 no changes. The performance measure is the annual return prior 
to the observation. 
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Table 1.6: Robustness Test of Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant -1.865*** -1.684*** -1.657*** 0.279 
 
   (-18.41) (-7.06) (-6.78) (0.79) 
   R -0.707*** -0.672* -0.670* -0.336 
 (-2.87) (-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.15) 
Dinside  -1.014* -1.032* -0.748 
 
 (-1.83) (-1.85) (-1.44) 
Doutside  -0.187 -0.190 -0.608** 
 
 (-0.77) (-0.79) (-2.23) 
Doutside_CEO  0.018 0.015 0.606*** 
 
 (0.09) (0.07) (2.72) 
CEO_chair    -0.067 
 
   (-0.27) 
CEO age   -0.198 -0.220 
 
  (-0.58) (-0.63) 
CEO tenure    -0.216*** 
 
   (-4.76) 
Ownership    -0.064 
 
   (-1.45) 
R * Dinside  0.812 0.807 0.292 
 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.28) 
R * Doutside  0.201 0.203 -0.243 
 
 (0.35) (0.35) (-0.44) 
R * Dinside *     -2.999 -2.992 -3.206*** 
Doutside_CEO  (-1.61) (-1.60) (-2.60) 
R * Doutside *     -0.281 -0.292 -0.268 
Doutside_CEO  (-0.40) (-0.42) (-0.37) 
Wald test  
(β3, β₅)     
Prob > chi2  0.910 0.905 0.684 
Log likelihood -351.98 -347.01 -346.82 -286.14 
R-squared 0.019 0.032 0.033 0.202 
Corrected Interaction Effect of β₄ on Model (4) based on Ai and Norton (2003) 
Interaction Term -1.684  
Z-Value -2.15  
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of pooled logit analysis of only forced CEO turnover 
regressed on performance measure, interactive terms between performance 
measure and board dummy variables, interactive terms between performance 
measure and outside CEO dummy variable, and other control variables for a 
sample of 123 CEO changes and 784 no changes. The performance measure is 
the annual return prior to the observation. 
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Table 1.7: Robustness Test of Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant 1.024*** 1.241*** 1.274*** 1.671*** 
 
   (9.57) (4.89) (4.99) (5.45) 
   R -0.589*** -0.518** -0.521** -0.543** 
 (-4.04) (-2.02) (-2.04) (-2.10) 
Dinside  -0.996*** -1.01*** -0.952** 
 
 (-2.59) (-2.62) (-2.51) 
Doutside  -0.055 -0.052 -0.140 
 
 (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.49) 
Doutside_CEO  -0.130 -0.142 -0.066 
 
 (-0.60) (-0.65) (-0.31) 
CEO_chair    -0.333 
 
   (-1.38) 
CEO age   -0.265 -0.336 
 
  (-0.73) (-0.91) 
CEO tenure    -0.027** 
 
   (-2.12) 
Ownership    -0.005 
 
   (-0.36) 
R * Dinside  0.750* 0.786* 0.783* 
 
 (1.76) (1.84) (1.86) 
R * Doutside  -0.444 -0.432 -0.448 
 
 (-1.07) (-1.03) (-1.04) 
R * Dinside *     -1.113** -1.132** -0.987* 
Doutside_CEO  (-2.02) (-2.04) (-1.89) 
R * Doutside *     0.380 0.377 0.414 
Doutside_CEO  (0.96) (0.94) (1.01) 
Wald test  
(β3, β₅)     
Prob > chi2  0.532 0.551 0.534 
Log likelihood -672.58 -665.48 -665.19 -661.42 
R-squared 0.042 0.067 0.068 0.081 
Corrected Interaction Effect of β₄ on Model (4) based on Ai and Norton (2003) 
Interaction Term -0.256  
Z-Value -1.49  
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of pooled logit analysis of CEO turnover regressed 
on performance measure, interactive terms between performance measure and 
board dummy variables, interactive terms between performance measure and 
outside CEO dummy variable, and other control variables for a sample of 363 
CEO changes and 784 no changes. The performance measure is the 2-year 
return prior to the observation. 
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Table 1.8: Robustness Test of Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant 0.979*** 1.301*** 1.281*** 1.850*** 
 
   (9.64) (5.02) (4.89) (5.88) 
   R -0.557*** -0.978*** -0.988*** -0.992*** 
 (-3.39) (-2.68) (-2.69) (-2.61) 
Dinside  -0.368 -0.361 -0.361 
 
 (-0.85) (-0.84) (-0.79) 
Doutside  -0.318 -0.314 -0.527* 
 
 (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.81) 
Doutside_CEO  -0.119 -0.118 0.049 
 
 (-0.58) (-0.58) (0.23) 
CEO_chair    0.415 
 
   (1.57) 
CEO age   0.195 0.259 
 
  (0.52) (0.68) 
CEO tenure    -0.052*** 
 
   (-3.88) 
Ownership    -0.017 
 
   (-1.07) 
R * Dinside  1.400 1.385 1.315 
 
 (1.39) (1.35) (1.16) 
R * Doutside  1.053 1.053 1.087 
 
 (1.28) (1.23) (0.86) 
R * Dinside *     -1.654* -1.615* -1.200* 
Doutside_CEO  (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.69) 
R * Doutside *     -0.792 -0.786 -0.855 
Doutside_CEO  (-1.32) (-1.30) (-1.24) 
Wald test  
(β3, β₅)     
Prob > chi2  0.478 0.479 0.472 
Log likelihood -692.77 -688.26 -688.12 -676.19 
R-squared 0.020 0.035 0.035 0.075 
Corrected Interaction Effect of β₄ on Model (4) based on Ai and Norton (2003) 
Interaction Term -0.103  
Z-Value -1.28  
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of pooled logit analysis of CEO turnover regressed 
on performance measure, interactive terms between performance measure and 
board dummy variables, interactive terms between performance measure and 
outside CEO dummy variable, and other control variables for a sample of 363 
CEO changes and 784 no changes. The performance measure is the Fama-
French four-factor risk-adjusted return prior to the observation. 
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Table 1.9: Estimates of Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant 0.889*** 0.936*** 0.887*** 1.319*** 
 
   (7.51) (5.82) (5.38) (5.75) 
   R -0.501** -0.228 -0.246 -0.226 
 (-2.40) (-0.69) (-0.74) (-0.66) 
Doutside_CEO  -0.093 -0.083 0.008 
 
 (-0.39) (-0.35) (0.04) 
CEO_chair    0.430 
 
   (1.41) 
CEO age   0.580 0.623 
 
  (1.21) (1.27) 
CEO tenure    -0.057*** 
 
   (-3.26) 
Ownership    -0.019 
 
   (-0.77) 
R * 
  
 
 -0.452 -0.449 -0.514 
Doutside_CEO  (-1.05) (-1.04) (-1.16) 
Log 
likelihood -309.30 -308.68 -307.87 -299.95 
R-squared 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.057 
Corrected Interaction Effect of R * Doutside_CEO on Model (4) based on Ai and 
Norton (2003)  
Interaction Term -0.095  
Z-Value -1.10  
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of pooled logit analysis of CEO turnover regressed on 
performance measure, interactive terms between performance measure and 
outside CEO dummy variable, and other control variables for a sample of 251 CEO 
changes and 553 no changes. The performance measure is the annual return prior 
to the observation. 
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Chapter 2 
The Impact on Firm Value: CEO Selection and Competition 
2.1 Introduction 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the most important economic agent 
in the firm.  The selection of the CEO affects the firm’s performance 
tremendously in all aspects because he/she has the ultimate responsibility to 
design and implement all policy decisions of the firm.  Indeed, the evidence in 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen et al. (2006), and Bennedsen et al. 
(2007) all shows that CEOs matter for firm performance.  Thus, the selection of 
CEO is critical.  This paper contributes to the literature by showing that product 
market competition is also an important factor in CEO selection.   
Choosing a right CEO is one of the most important decisions made by a 
firm’s board of directors.  When hiring a new CEO, the board has two options.  
The board can promote one of the firm’s current executives or board members to 
be the new CEO.  We refer to the CEOs who are promoted from within the firm 
(an officer or an inside director of the firm prior to their appointment) as inside 
CEOs.  Alternatively, the board can hire someone outside the company to be the 
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new CEO.  We call these outside CEOs since they were not an officer or an 
inside director of the hiring firm prior to their appointment.  The decision to 
promote an insider or hire an outsider to be the CEO depends on the quality of 
internal and external candidates.  When choosing a new CEO, the board 
considers how well suited the abilities of each candidate are for the competitive 
environment faced by the firm.  Due to the existence of information asymmetry 
between CEO candidates and the board of directors, board members should be 
able to more accurately evaluate the abilities of inside candidates because they 
know better the characteristics of these candidates.  Internal candidates must 
first survive the in-house tournaments to become an executive or a director.  This 
internal selection process provides the board with plenty of opportunities to 
assess how well the internal candidates would match the firm’s mode of 
operations and culture.  Holmstrom (1982) models the mechanism by which a 
principal can learn about the agent’s ability over time.  He shows that the 
updating of ability estimate becomes more informative each successive period.  
Therefore, it is likely that the board has the opportunity to update its ability 
estimate of an inside CEO candidate more accurately over time.  As a result, the 
possibility of having a mismatch between an inside candidate and the CEO 
position is lower than between an outside candidate and the CEO position.  The 
greater the lack of knowledge about the ability and fit of outside candidates, the 
greater the dispersion in the assessment of a pool of such candidates, even if 
they are on average of similar quality.  In this regard, inside CEOs should 
outperform outside CEOs as the job matching theory in labor economics has 
35 
 
showed that the best performance is the result of the best match between a job 
and the worker whose skill set best fits the needs of the firm (Jovanovic, 1979; 
Jovanovic, 1984; Simon and Warner, 1992; McLaughlin, 1994).  
Proponents of hiring external candidates to the position of CEO, however, 
believe that managerial skills that come from both innate abilities and 
experiences are transferable between firms.  This means that a successful CEO 
at one firm will be able to replicate the success at other firms with his managerial 
skills.  Indeed, while most of the internal candidates for a CEO position have no 
previous experience serving as a CEO, many external candidates tend to have 
impressive stories of being a successful CEO elsewhere.  However, the literature 
has showed mixed results.  While some researches present evidence that, on 
average, externally hired CEOs outperform internally promoted CEOs, others find 
the opposite.4   
Externally hired CEOs are believed to be more willing and able to change 
a firm to make it more efficient than internally promoted CEOs who are burdened 
by internal connections (Cao and Mauer, 2010).  However, hiring external CEOs 
is not without costs.  Agrawal et al. (2006) shows that disincentives and 
discouragements created to current employees who hope to become the CEO 
can be costly to the firm.  Given the cost and benefit, companies whose benefits 
of hiring external CEOs outweigh the costs should find it valuable in doing so.  In 
contrast, companies whose costs of hiring external CEOs outweigh the benefits 
will find it more valuable to promote new CEOs internally.   
                                                          
4
 See the literature review for detailed descriptions of these researches. 
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The benefits for firms to hire external CEOs are not the same according to 
two competing theories: increasing incentive theory and Schumpeterian theory.  
According to increasing incentive theory, product market competition induces 
managers to improve efficiency by increasing their supply of effort (Hart, 1983; 
Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Karuna, 2007).  With a higher level of 
competition, CEOs have greater incentives to work harder in order to retain their 
jobs because an increase in competition increases the likelihood of liquidation.  
Unlike inside CEOs who are burdened with internal connections, outside CEOs 
are more able and willing to improve firm efficiency with necessary restructuring.  
When an outside CEO is motivated to work harder by product market competition, 
the value he creates for the firm may be higher than the cost of discouragements 
to current employees.  As a result, it will increase firm value for companies in the 
more competitive environment to hire outside CEOs because the benefits of 
hiring outside CEOs may outweigh the costs.   
However, Schumpeterian theory suggests that competition increases 
managerial slack and firms need to provide stronger incentives for their CEOs 
(Scharfstein, 1988; Raith, 2003).  Firms that survive in more competitive 
industries should have already operated in a very efficient mode.  The CEOs of 
these firms realize that there is not much room that is worth improving so they 
tend to work less hard.  When an outside CEO is not motivated to work harder by 
product market competition, the value he creates for the firm may not be high 
enough to cover the cost of discouragements to current employees.  However, 
CEOs of firms in a less competitive environment are more motivated to work hard 
37 
 
because they know there is huge space to improve and more profit can be 
extracted for being more efficient.  Consequently, Schumpeterian theory 
suggests that it will increase firm value for companies in the less competitive 
environment to hire outside CEOs because the benefits will outweigh the costs.       
We test the two theories using a sample of 461 CEO turnovers from 1998 
to 2004.  Our results support Schumpeterian theory, which suggests that firms 
will be better off hiring an outside CEO if they operate in a low product 
competition environment.  The evidence shows that hiring an outside CEO for a 
firm in a low product competition environment will increase the firm’s value by 
about 3% for the entire tenure of the CEO.  The main contribution of this paper is 
to show that product market competition is important in CEO selection.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we 
summarize the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses.  In section 3, we 
describe data sources and variables used in the analysis.  In section 4, we 
present empirical findings, and in section 5, we conclude.       
2.2 Relevant Literature and Hypothesis Development  
2.2.1 Literature on CEO and firm performance 
Various studies have showed mixed results for post-succession 
performance comparison between externally hired and internally promoted CEOs.  
However, their findings are only based on different accounting measures that 
they choose to estimate firm value.  When the most commonly used measure for 
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firm value, Tobin’s q, is used, their results disappear.  Our paper identifies 
product market competition as an important factor in CEO selection.  We show 
that firms will be better off with hiring an outside CEO by having a higher firm 
value measured in Tobin’s q when the firms operate in a low product competition 
industry.   
Some studies, present evidence that, on average, externally hired CEOs 
outperform internally promoted CEOs.  Huson et al. (2004) use a sample of all 
CEOs listed in the Forbes annual compensation surveys over the 1971-1995 
period, and document that post-turnover changes in firm’s operating rate of 
return on total assets (OROA) are positive and greater when the successor 
CEOs are hired externally.5  They classified each succession as either forced or 
voluntary by using the Wall Street Journal.  However, there is no evidence 
showing a difference between post-turnover performance changes for forced and 
voluntary successions.  Falato et al. (2009) use a hand-collected sample of 2,195 
CEO successions between 1993 and 2005, and document that appointments of 
talented CEOs are associated with significantly higher stock market returns and 
operating performance, and the positive relation between firm performance and 
CEO talent is significantly stronger for outside successions.  Liang (2007) uses a 
survey dataset covering 800 Chinese enterprises from 1994 to 1999, and finds 
that productivity of a firm increases by two to three percentage points more when 
an outside CEO is appointed than when an insider is appointed.   
However, there is also evidence in the literature that shows CEOs who are 
promoted from within the firm outperform outside CEOs.  Zajac (1990) uses a 
                                                          
5
 OROA is the ratio of operating income to book value of assets. 
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sample of Forbes 500 listing companies combined with some very large firms 
that are not listed in the Forbes 500 index but designated by Forbes as having 
annual sales of at least $1 billion.  He finds that firms with inside CEOs tend to be 
significantly more profitable than firms with outside CEOs.  The post-succession 
average return on assets (ROA) associated with inside CEOs is significantly 
higher than the average ROA associated with outside CEOs.  He argues that 
because of asymmetric information, board of directors is more likely to know 
better the characteristics of a CEO candidate who is from within the firm.  
Therefore, boards have advantage in observing the characteristics of an inside 
CEO, but may face a relative informational disadvantage in considering outside 
CEOs.  Even though boards may have informational disadvantage in considering 
outside CEOs, it may still be beneficial to the firms when certain criteria are met 
such as the product market competition that we identify in this paper.  Ang and 
Nagel (2010) use a sample of non-financial firm CEO appointments for 
companies that have total assets greater than $250 million at the start of the 
CEO’s tenure over the period from 1970 to 2005.  They find that inside CEOs 
deliver superior performance that persists for more years than outside CEOs.  
Also, in some cases which internal CEOs are perceived to be inferior, they still do 
not underperform and in many circumstances outperform outside CEOs.  
However, after the hiring date, no difference is found between inside and outside 
hires’ Tobin’s q.     
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2.2.2 Costs of hiring external CEOs 
 In addition to the benefits that externally hired CEOs could bring to the 
hiring firm such as new innovative ideas in production, management, etc., there 
are also costs associated with hiring CEOs externally such as the disincentives 
and discouragements to current employees who are in the process to survive the 
in-house tournaments to become an internal candidate for the CEO position.  
Agrawal et al. (2006) document that when firms are choosing new CEOs, 
external candidates are handicapped.  They argue that in order to win the prize 
of being named CEO, employees of the firm will compete with each other.  Such 
aspirations provide employees with an incentive to work hard.  The more 
responsive is an employee’s chance of winning, the greater is the incentive effect 
that CEO aspirations have on employees’ effort.  Adding outsiders to the 
competition to become CEO typically weakens the relation between hard work by 
an insider and his chance of success to the CEO position.  As a result, including 
outsiders in the succession contest typically reduces the incentive that current 
employees have to work hard.  In many cases, incumbent executive officers may 
be forced to leave the firm or choose to leave voluntarily when the firm hires a 
new CEO externally (Fee and Hadlock, 2004).  Shen and Cannella (2002) show 
that focusing on a CEO successor alone without considering other personnel 
changes within top management cannot fully and accurately capture the 
performance consequences of CEO succession.  Post-succession senior 
executive turnover has been primarily studied as an outcome of CEO succession 
(Friedman and Saul, 1991).  Results of this study suggest that post-succession 
41 
 
senior executive turnover has important implications for firm performance and, 
more important, that the direction of its impact depends on successor type.  They 
find that senior executive turnover has a positive impact on firm ROA in insider 
succession, but a negative impact in outsider succession.  Shen and Cannella 
(2002) find that senior executive turnover has a negative impact on firm 
performance when the successor is an outsider.  Because there are both benefits 
and costs associated with hiring new CEOs externally, firms whose benefits of 
hiring external CEOs outweigh the costs should find it valuable in doing so.  
Contrarily, firms whose costs of hiring external CEOs outweigh the benefits will 
find it more economically sensible to promote new CEOs internally.  Firms whose 
externally hired CEOs work harder will benefit more from outside hires, whereas 
firms whose outside CEOs work less hard will benefit less from outside hires.  
Given the costs of hiring external CEOs, when firms benefit more, it is more likely 
to have positive impact on firm value than when firms benefit less.  CEOs’ effort 
depends on incentives provided to them.  As a result, whether product market 
competition serves as an incentive or disincentive to CEOs depends on the 
dominance between increasing incentive theory and Schumpeterian theory.    
2.2.3 Product market competition and hypothesis development 
As we have seen from the mixed results in the literature on CEO selection 
and firm performance, some previous studies find external CEOs outperform 
internal CEOs based on some accounting measures of performance, whereas 
others find the opposite based on different accounting measures of performance.  
42 
 
However, none of the previous studies has showed a significant result when the 
most conventional measure of firm value Tobin’s q was used.  If firms in different 
competitive environments have different benefits with hiring external CEOs, then 
insignificant Tobin’s q may be what we can observe.  That is, no one group of 
CEOs (external or internal) will always outperform the other.  It may be 
advantageous for some firms to hire external CEOs, and others to hire internal 
CEOs.  The main contribution of this paper is to add a crucial dimension of 
product market competition to the selection of CEOs by linking the literature on 
CEO selection and firm performance with the literature of the principal-agent 
problem to the degree of competition in product markets.   
Hart (1983), Hermalin (1992), Schmidt (1997), and Karuna (2007) 
consider whether product market competition induces managers to improve 
efficiency by increasing their supply of effort (increasing incentive theory).  These 
papers show that increased competition in a product market increases the 
provision of effort by managers.  Hart (1983) shows that greater competition 
provides stronger implicit managerial incentives, as additional market players 
make firms better informed and thus better able to evaluate managers’ actions.  
Similarly, Schmidt (1997) shows that an increase in competition increases the 
likelihood of liquidation and therefore greater incentives to managers, who work 
harder to retain their jobs.  Karuna (2007) also finds results that support the 
conclusion that firms provide stronger managerial incentives when industry 
competition is greater.  So what kind of firms should find it more valuable to hire 
new CEOs externally than to promote from within the company?  According to 
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increasing incentive theory, product market competition serves as a positive 
incentive that makes CEOs work harder.  When outside CEOs work harder, the 
benefits of hiring them are more likely to outweigh the costs.  Therefore, the 
impact on firm value of hiring external CEOs may be positive for firms in a more 
competitive industry.  Contrarily, in a less competitive industry, without product 
market competition to motivate CEOs to put more effort into work, the costs of 
hiring them are more likely to outweigh the benefits.  Therefore, the impact on 
firm value of hiring external CEOs may be negative for firms in a less competitive 
industry.  
 
Hypothesis I: For firms in more competitive product markets, the benefits 
of hiring outside CEOs are greater than the costs. Therefore, firms should 
hire outside CEOs. 
 
Hypothesis II: For firms in less competitive product markets, the benefits 
of hiring outside CEOs are smaller than the costs. Therefore, firms should 
promote inside CEO candidates. 
 
In contrast to increasing incentive theory, Schumpeterian theory suggests 
that competition increases managerial slack (Scharfstein, 1988; Raith, 2003).  
Scharfstein (1988) among others shows that competition may actually 
exacerbate the incentive problem.  Schumpeterian theory argues that firms in a 
less competitive environment may not be operated efficiently so there is much 
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room to improve.  However, firms that survive in a more competitive environment 
should have already in an extremely efficient mode so there is not much space to 
improve.  Knowing that more profit can be extracted for being more efficient, 
managers of firms in a less competitive environment are more motivated to work 
hard.  Managers of firms in a more competitive environment are less motivated to 
work hard because it is very difficult to further enhance efficiency.  Therefore, if 
Schumpeterian theory is supported, product market competition serves as a 
negative incentive that makes CEOs put less effort into work.  When outside 
CEOs work less hard, the costs of hiring them are more likely to outweigh the 
benefits.  Therefore, the impact on firm value of hiring external CEOs may be 
negative for firms in a more competitive industry.  Because CEOs work harder, 
the benefits associated with hiring outside CEOs may be greater than the costs 
for firms in a less competitive environment. 
 
Hypothesis III: For firms in more competitive product markets, the costs of 
hiring outside CEOs are greater than the benefits. Therefore, firms should 
promote inside CEO candidates. 
 
Hypothesis IV: For firms in less competitive product markets, the benefits 
of hiring outside CEOs are greater than the costs. Therefore, firms should 
hire outside CEOs. 
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2.3 Data and Variables 
2.3.1 Sample 
We identify the CEO turnover sample for both voluntary and forced leaves 
from ExecuComp database over the period from 1998 to 2004.  We obtain 
information of CEOs and board members from ExecuComp, proxy statements, 
10-K reports, and Edgar data retrieval system.  For each observation in the 
sample, financial data must be available from either the University of Chicago’s 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or the Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat database.  Mergers and acquisitions data is obtained from Security 
Data Corporation (SDC).  CEOs are categorized into two groups; inside or 
outside CEOs.  Inside CEOs are those who were an officer or an inside director 
of the hiring firm prior to their appointment whereas outside CEOs are those who 
were not an officer or an inside director of the hiring firm prior to their 
appointment.  We eliminate the resignations of CEOs from the sample if they are 
directly related to takeovers.  Our final sample comprises observations for 461 
CEO turnovers across all industrial sectors in the economy. 
2.3.2 Measure of firm value 
Firm value is measured by Tobin’s q according to Chung and Pruitt (1994) 
method.  Approximate Tobin’s Q is computed as follows: 
 
Approximate q= (MVE+PS+DEBT)/TA      (1) 
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Where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of common 
stock shares outstanding, PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding 
preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its 
short-term assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the 
book value of the total assets of the firm.  Approximate q requires only basic 
financial and accounting information.  Furthermore, results of a series of 
regression comparisons indicate that at least 96.6% of the variability of Tobin’s q 
is explained by approximate q.  The cumulative amount of value created is 
directly related to the CEO’s performance.  Therefore, the dependent variable 
used in the regressions is the change in Tobin’s q of a firm from the year of hire 
to the year of the turnover of the CEO.   
2.3.3 Measures of competition 
2.3.3.1 Herfindahl index 
The first measure of competition we use is Herfindahl index, a measure of 
the size of firms in relation to the industry, as an indicator of the amount of 
competition among firms.  The Herfindahl index can range from 0 to 1, moving 
from an extremely large number of very small firms to a single monopoly.  
Increases in the Herfindahl index indicate a decrease in competition and an 
increase of market power.   
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2.3.3.2 Product substitutability 
 The second measure of competition we use is product substitutability.  
Prior studies in the industrial organizations literature have used the price-cost 
margin to measure product substitutability in an industry (Demsetz, 1997; 
Besanko et al., 2000; Nevo, 2001).  Low (high) levels of the price-cost margin 
signify high (low) levels of substitutability.  Hence, the greater the intensity of 
price competition due to higher substitutability, the smaller the price-cost margin 
is.  We calculate the price-cost margin as sales divided by operating costs, all at 
the four-digit SIC code level.   
2.3.3.3 Market size 
The third measure of competition we use is market size.  Market size 
reflects the density of consumers in a market or industry.  We measure an 
industry’s market size by industry sales.  This reflects the fact that, when market 
demand for a product increases at any given price, sales of that product also 
increase.    
2.3.4 Methodology 
Following the methodology of Huson et al. (2004) and Ang and Nagel 
(2010), we use the lagged value of firm characteristics to account for 
endogeneity concerns.  There is a possible selection bias in the estimation of an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with change of firm value as the 
dependent variable and CEO and other firm characteristics as independent 
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variables because there may be systematic differences between firms that hire 
external and internal CEOs.  As a result, we use the two-step procedure 
introduced by Heckman (1979) to compute the inverse Mills ratio (IML) to control 
for potential selection bias.  A probit model, in which the dependent variable 
equals one if the CEO is hired externally and zero otherwise, is first used to 
estimate the IML, where 
 
IML =  
(

)
(

)
 .         (2) 
In equation (2),  and  represent the density and cumulative density functions 
of the standard normal distribution, respectively,   is a vector that contains 
observations for the independent variables predicting whether a firm hires an 
external CEO, β is the vector of coefficient estimates from the probit regression, 
and σ is the standard deviation for the residuals from the probit regression.  The 
second step of the Heckman procedure is to simply estimate the OLS regression 
with the IML as an independent variable.  
To investigate how CEO hiring sources and competitive environments 
affect firm value, we use OLS regressions to estimate the relation between the 
change in firm value and the interaction between CEO hiring sources and 
industry competitiveness.  The complete regression model is as follows:    
 
∆ Tobin’s qt =  
α + β₁ * Doutside_highH + β₂ *  Doutside_lowH + β3  *  Dinside_highH 
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+
 
δ₁ * Ln (total assets) + δ₂ * (∆ Leverage)t-1 + δ₃ * (∆ R&D)t-1 
+ δ₄ * (CEO_chair) + δ₅ * (∆ percentage of outside directors)t-1  
+ δ₆ * (∆ number of directors)t-1 + δ₇ * (∆ CEO ownership)t-1  
+ δ₈ * (∆ institution ownership)t-1 + δ₉ * (CEO tenure)  
+ δ10 * (∆ Tobin’s q)t-1 + δ11 * IML + ε                                                (3)                           
 
Doutside_highH is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm hires an 
outside CEO and is in a high Herfindahl industry (less competitive), and 0 
otherwise.  An industry’s Herfindahl index is considered high (low) if it is above 
(below) the sample median.  Doutside_lowH is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the firm has an outside CEO and is in a low Herfindahl industry (more 
competitive), and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, Dinside_highH is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm has an inside CEO and is not in a competitive industry, and 
0 otherwise.  We measure firm size by total assets in millions of dollars, and 
leverage by the ratio of long term debt to total assets.  R&D is research and 
development of the firm to proxy its growth opportunities.  CEO_chair is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise.  Percentage of outside directors is the percentage of outside directors 
on the firm’s board to proxy board independence.  Number of directors is the 
number of directors on the board to proxy board size.  CEO ownership is the 
percentage of shares held by the firm’s CEO.  Institution ownership is the 
percentage of shares held by institutions.  Finally, we control for CEO tenure and 
past performance.  The detailed definitions of all variables are shown in Table 2.1. 
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If increasing incentive theory is supported, we expect the sign of the 
coefficient of Doutside_highH ( β₁ in equation (3) ) not to be significantly positive 
because the benefits for a firm to hire an outside CEO in a less competitive 
industry should be smaller than the costs.  Thus, the total effect should be 
negative (hypothesis II).   
The sign of the coefficient of Doutside_lowH  ( β₂ in equation (3) ) is expected 
to be positive and significant because the benefits for a firm to hire an outside 
CEO in a more competitive industry are greater than the costs, and the total 
effect will be positive (hypothesis I).   
If Schumpeterian theory is supported, the sign of the coefficient of 
Doutside_highH ( β₁ in equation (3) ) should be positive and significant.  The benefits 
for a firm to hire an outside CEO in a less competitive industry are greater than 
the costs, therefore, the total effect should be positive (hypothesis IV).  Also, the 
sign of the coefficient of Doutside_lowH  ( β₂ in equation (3) ) is expected not to be 
significantly positive because the benefits for a firm to hire an outside CEO in a 
more competitive industry are smaller than the costs, thus, the total effect should 
be negative (hypothesis III).  Lastly, the coefficient of Dinside_highH ( β₃ in equation 
(3) ) indicates the total effect on the change of firm value when a firm hires an 
inside CEO in a less competitive industry.  Therefore, β₃ should be statistically 
insignificant because when a firm hires an inside CEO, both the benefits and 
costs associated with hiring an outside CEO are not relevant.         
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2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.2 provides the mean, median, standard deviation, 5th percentile, 
and 95th percentile of all the variables we use in our regressions.  The mean of 
the outside CEO_high Herfindahl dummy is 0.065, while the median value of this 
dummy variable is 0.  The mean of the outside CEO_low Herfindahl dummy is 
0.245, while the median value of this dummy variable is also 0.   
Table 2.3 shows the distributions of inside and outside CEOs under high 
and low Herfindahl industries.  An industry’s Herfindahl index is considered high 
(low) if it is above (below) the sample median.  The final sample has 31 inside 
CEOs (50.8%) and 30 outside CEOs (49.2%) in high Herfindahl industries, while 
it has 287 inside CEOs (71.7%) and 113 outside CEOs (28.3%) in low Herfindahl 
industries.  
Table 2.4 presents Pearson correlations between independent variables 
included in the regression tests.  Except for the correlation between total assets 
and the change in board size, and the correlation between the change in 
leverage and the change in Tobin’s q, all other correlations are small in 
magnitude (the absolute correlation coefficients are not higher than 0.3).  This 
suggests that multicollinearity is not likely to pose a serious problem in the 
multivariate analysis.  
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2.4.2 The impact of CEO selection on firm value 
Table 2.5 reports the results of OLS models that predict the percentage 
change in Tobin’s q of a firm from the year of hire to the year of the turnover of 
the CEO.  The dependent variable is the percentage change in Tobin’s q of a firm 
from the year of hire to the year of the turnover of the CEO.  Independent 
variables include outside CEO_high Herfindahl dummy (equal to 1 if the firm is in 
a high Herfindahl industry and has an outside CEO and zero otherwise), outside 
CEO_low Herfindahl dummy (equal to 1 if the firm is in a low Herfindahl industry 
and has an outside CEO and zero otherwise), inside CEO_high Herfindahl 
dummy (equal to 1 if the firm is in a high Herfindahl industry and has an inside 
CEO and zero otherwise), and other control variables as specified in equation (3).   
The first column of Table 2.5 shows that the coefficient on outside 
CEO_high Herfindahl dummy is positive and significantly different from zero 
(0.036).  This means that the firm value will be increased by 3.6% when a firm 
operates in a high Herfindahl industry hires an outside CEO.   
The second column of Table 2.5 examines the effect of CEO selection on 
firm value when controlling for governance variables.  The coefficient on outside 
CEO_high Herfindahl dummy is positive and significantly different from zero 
(0.032).  This means that the firm value will be increased by 3.2% when a firm 
operates in a high Herfindahl industry hires an outside CEO when controlling for 
governance variables.       
The third column of Table 2.5 examines the effect of CEO selection on 
firm value when controlling for economic variables, while the final column 
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controls for both governance and economic variables.  The results of the third 
and the final columns are similar to those of the second column.  The final 
column of table 2.5 shows that the coefficient on outside CEO_high Herfindahl 
dummy is 0.034 and significant at the 10% level.  This suggests that the firm 
value will be increased by 3.4% when a firm operates in a high Herfindahl 
industry hires an outside CEO when controlling for both governance and 
economic variables.  Also note that the estimated coefficient on the outside 
CEO_low Herfindahl dummy is consistently insignificant for all OLS models in 
table 2.5.  This indeed indicates that Schumpeterian theory is supported. 
Table 2.5 also reports that the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables are generally in the predicted direction.  The estimated coefficient on 
CEO_chair dummy is -0.017, suggesting a reduction of firm value by 1.7% when 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board.  The estimated coefficient on board 
size is -0.003.  This means that when board size increases by 1%, firm value will 
drop by 0.3%.  The estimated coefficient on CEO ownership is -0.0007.  This 
means that when CEOs own one percent more of their firms, firm value will drop 
by 0.07%.                  
2.4.3 Robustness checks 
Table 2.6 presents OLS results when we use product substitutability to 
determine the level of product market competition.  Low (high) levels of the price-
cost margin signify high (low) levels of substitutability.  Hence, the greater the 
intensity of price competition due to higher substitutability, the smaller the price-
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cost margin is.  We calculate the price-cost margin as sales divided by operating 
costs, all at the four-digit SIC code level.  
 The final column of Table 2.6 shows that the coefficient on outside 
CEO_high price-cost margin dummy is 0.089 and significant at the 1% level.  
This suggests that the firm value will be increased by 8.9% when a firm operates 
in a high price-cost margin industry hires an outside CEO when controlling for 
both governance and economic variables.  This result is stronger than the result 
in Table 2.5 and suggests that again, Schumpeterian theory is supported.  In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on the outside CEO_low price-cost margin 
dummy is consistently insignificant for all OLS models in table 2.6. 
We also estimate the same OLS models with market size as the measure 
of competition.  Market size reflects the density of consumers in a market or 
industry.  We measure an industry’s market size by industry sales.  The results 
are consistent and similar to those reported in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.7 reports the results of OLS models that predict the percentage 
change in the Fama-French four-factor risk-adjusted return of a firm from the 
year of hire to the year of the turnover of the CEO.  The dependent variable is the 
percentage change in return of a firm from the year of hire to the year of the 
turnover of the CEO.  Independent variables include outside CEO_high 
Herfindahl dummy (equal to 1 if the firm is in a high Herfindahl industry and has 
an outside CEO and zero otherwise), outside CEO_low Herfindahl dummy (equal 
to 1 if the firm is in a low Herfindahl industry and has an outside CEO and zero 
otherwise), inside CEO_high Herfindahl dummy (equal to 1 if the firm is in a high 
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Herfindahl industry and has an inside CEO and zero otherwise), and other 
control variables as specified in equation (3).  
The final column of Table 2.7 shows that the coefficient on outside 
CEO_high Herfindahl dummy is 0.005 and significant at the 10% level.  This 
suggests that the firm value will be increased by 0.5% when a firm operates in a 
high Herfindahl industry hires an outside CEO when controlling for both 
governance and economic variables.  This result is similar to the result in Table 
2.5 and suggests that again, Schumpeterian theory is supported.   
2.5 Conclusions 
We examine the relation between the change in a firm’s value and its CEO 
selection sources: internal promotion versus external hire in both high and low 
product competition environments.  Specifically, we tested the implications of two 
competing theories. First, we examine increasing incentive theory that suggests 
firms operate in more competitive product markets will be better off hiring outside 
CEOs.  Second, we examine Schumpeterian theory that suggests firms operate 
in less competitive product markets will be better off hiring outside CEOs.  Our 
results support Schumpeterian theory.  The evidence shows that hiring an 
outside CEO for a firm in a low product competition environment will increase the 
firm’s value by about 3% for the entire tenure of the CEO.   
Therefore, there is no one group of CEOs that can always outperform the 
other.  Which type of CEO to hire in order to increase firm value depends on the 
level of product market competition of the industry that the firm is in.  Aivazian et 
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al. (2012) document that firms in industries relying on general managerial skills 
are more likely to hire outside CEOs than firms in industries relying less on such 
skills.  They find that firms relying on outside CEOs have on average higher 
profits than inside-CEO firms.  Our results show that firms will be better off hiring 
an outside CEO when the firms operate in a low product competition industry.  It 
is possible that firms in a low product competition industry rely on general 
managerial skills more than do firms in a high product competition industry.  The 
main contribution of this paper is to link the literature on CEO selection and firm 
performance with the literature of the principal-agent problem to the degree of 
competition in product markets.  Our results are robust to various measures of 
market competition. 
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions  
 
  
Variable Description Definition 
 Summary Statistics and Correlation Table Variables 
N Number of Turnover The number of CEO turnover.  
∆ Tobin’s q  Change in Tobin’s q 
Percentage change in Tobin’s q of a firm from 
the year of hire to the year of the turnover of 
the CEO. 
Doutside_highH 
Outside CEO in a 
high Herfindahl 
Industry 
Binary variable equal to one if the firm is in a 
high Herfindahl industry and has an outside 
CEO and zero otherwise.  
Doutside_lowH 
Outside CEO in a 
low Herfindahl 
Industry 
Binary variable equal to one if the firm is in a 
low Herfindahl industry and has an outside 
CEO and zero otherwise. 
Dinside_highH 
Inside CEO in a 
high Herfindahl 
Industry 
Binary variable equal to one if the firm is in a 
high Herfindahl industry and has an inside 
CEO and zero otherwise. 
Ln (total 
assets) Total Assets Natural log of total assets of a firm. 
∆ Leverage Change in Leverage 
Percentage change in leverage of a firm from 
the year of hire to the year of the turnover of 
the CEO. 
∆ R&D Change in R&D 
Percentage change in R&D of a firm from the 
year of hire to the year of the turnover of the 
CEO. 
CEO_chair CEO Durality Binary variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
∆ pct_outd Change in Outside Directors 
Percentage change in the outside directors 
from the year of hire to the year of the 
turnover of the CEO. 
∆ board size Change in Number 
of Directors 
Percentage change in the total number of 
directors from the year of hire to the year of 
the turnover of the CEO. 
CEO tenure CEO Tenure The number of years the CEO had held the position as of the year of the turnover. 
∆ CEO 
ownership 
Change in CEO 
Ownership 
Percentage change in the fraction of shares 
owned by the CEO from the year of hire to the 
year of the turnover of the CEO.  
∆ institution 
ownership 
Change in institution 
Ownership 
Percentage change in the fraction of shares 
owned by institutions from the year of hire to 
the year of the turnover of the CEO.  
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median σ 5th  95th 
Doutside_highH 461 0.06507 0 0.24692 0 1 
Doutside_lowH 461 0.24511 0 0.43062 0 1 
Dinside_highH 461 0.06724 0 0.25071 0 1 
Ln (total assets) 461 7.34862 7.35188 1.62284 4.80338 10.0293 
CEO_chair 461 0.29501 0 0.45654 0 1 
∆ Leverage 461 0.02025 0.01839 0.01753 0 0.0498 
CEO tenure 461 9.32104 8 7.71031 1 25 
∆ R&D 461 -0.1674 0 0.27218 -0.34 0.06 
∆ pct_outd 461 0.24259 0.26666 0.0796 0.08571 0.28888 
∆ board size 461 0.09338 0.12457 0.02966 0.05 0.18 
∆ CEO ownership 461 0.00201 0 0.00104 0 0.007 
∆ institution ownership 461 0.07018 0 0.06041 0 0.118 
Descriptive statistics for firms that had voluntary and forced CEO turnovers from 1998 through 
2004. 
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Table 2.3: Frequency Table 
 
Inside CEO outside CEO Total 
High Herfindahl 
Index 31 30 61 
 
           (50.8%)         (49.2%)   
Low Herfindahl 
Index 287 113 400 
 (71.7%) (28.3%)  
Total 318 143 461 
 (68.9%) (31.1%)  
The frequency of inside and outside CEO representation under high 
Herfindahl Index and low Herfindahl Index based on 461 
observations of both voluntary and forced CEO turnovers from 1998 
through 2004. Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
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Table 2.4: Pearson Correlation 
 
Doutside 
_highH 
Doutside 
_lowH 
Dinside 
_highH 
Ln  
(total 
assets) 
CEO 
_chair 
∆ Leverage
 
t-1 
CEO  
tenure 
∆ R&D 
 t-1 
∆ pct_outd
 
t-1 
∆ board size
 
t-1 
∆ CEO 
ownership 
 t-1 
∆ Instn 
ownership 
 t-1 
∆ Tobin’s q
 
t-1 
Doutside_highH 1 -0.15*** -0.07 -0.09** 0.06 0.05 0.001 -0.003 -0.04 -0.16** -0.004 0.17* -0.003 
Doutside_lowH  1 -0.15*** -0.2*** -0.05 -0.02 0.1** 0.03 0.01 -0.28** 0.15** 0.12* -0.13** 
Dinside_highH   1 -0.08* 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.003 
Ln  
(total assets)    1 0.11
***
 0.26*** 0.07 -0.1** 0.15*** 0.6*** -0.1** 0.09 0.29*** 
CEO_chair     1 0.02 0.11** -0.06 0.12*** 0.06 0.07 0.12** 0.03 
∆ Leveraget-1      1 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.14*** -0.07 -0.08 0.53*** 
CEO tenure       1 -0.06 -0.12** 0.11** 0.3*** -0.01 0.04 
∆ R&Dt-1        1 -0.05 -0.1** 0.02 -0.06 0.01 
∆ pct_outd
 t-1         1 0.03 -0.24*** 0.05 -0.003 
∆ board size
 t-1          1 -0.1** 0.03 0.22*** 
∆ CEO 
ownershipt-1           1 -0.22
**
 -0.1** 
∆ Instn 
ownershipt-1            1  
∆ Tobin’s q
 t-1             1 
Correlations are based on 461 observations. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
  *  p<10%, **  p<5%, ***  p<1% 
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Table 2.5: Estimates of OLS Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant 0.07***    0.094*** 0.061**   0.081*** 
 
   (3.26) (2.8) (2.38) (2.8) 
 Doutside_highH 0.036** 0.032* 0.039** 0.034* 
 
   (1.97) (1.73) (2.05) (1.76) 
Doutside_lowH    0.016 0.012 0.018 0.013 
 
   (1.54) (1.04) (1.43) (1.14) 
Dinside_highH    0.001 -0.0007 0.001 0.002 
 
   (0.05) (-0.04) (0.09) (0.12) 
Ln (total assets)   0.001 0.005 
 
  (0.6) (1.58) 
∆ Leveraget-1   -0.013 -0.014 
 
  (-0.39) (-0.42) 
∆ R&D
 t-1   -0.00002 -0.00003 
 
  (-0.19) (-0.29) 
CEO_chair  -0.016  -0.017* 
 
 (-1.57)  (-1.71) 
∆ pct_outd
 t-1  -0.029  -0.035 
 
 (-1.1)  (-1.31) 
∆ board size
 t-1  -0.001  -0.003* 
 
 (-0.95)  (-1.66) 
∆ CEO ownership
 t-1  -0.0007  -0.0007 
 
 (-0.95)  (-0.93) 
∆ institution ownership
 t-1  0.0109  0.007 
 
 (1.12)  (1.26) 
CEO tenure  0.001*  0.001* 
  (1.7)  (1.66) 
∆ Tobin’s q
 t-1 0.856*** 0.857*** 0.858*** 0.855*** 
    (35.8) (31.8) (29.9) (29.75) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.005 0.012 0.012 0.378 
    (0.56) (0.34) (1.09) (1.23) 
R-squared   0.5377 0.5392 0.5362 0.5390 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of OLS regression analysis of change in Tobin’s q at time t 
regressed on outside CEO and high Herfindahl dummy variable, outside CEO and low 
Herfindahl dummy variable, inside CEO and high Herfindahl dummy variable, and other 
economic and governance control variables for a sample of 461 CEO turnovers.  
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Table 2.6: Robustness Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant 0.067*** 0.092*** 0.051** 0.070** 
 
   (3.57) (3.54) (2.16) (2.45) 
 Doutside_high_PCmargin 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 
 
   (4.42) (4.32) (4.45) (4.39) 
Doutside_low_PCmargin   0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 
 
   (0.24) (-0.18) (0.43) (-0.1) 
Dinside_high_PCmargin   -0.03 -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 
 
   (-1.54) (-1.41) (-1.46) (-1.36) 
Ln (total assets)   0.002 0.006* 
 
  (0.77) (1.74) 
∆ Leveraget-1   -0.017 -0.018 
 
  (-0.51) (-0.55) 
∆ R&D
 t-1   -0.00001 -0.00002 
 
  (-0.11) (-0.21) 
CEO_chair  -0.016*  -0.018* 
 
 (-1.70)  (-1.85) 
∆ pct_outd
 t-1  -0.021  -0.027 
 
 (-0.82)  (-1.06) 
∆ board size
 t-1  -0.001  -0.003* 
 
 (-0.94)  (-1.73) 
∆ CEO ownership
 t-1  -0.0006  -0.0006 
 
 (-0.79)  (-0.77) 
∆ institution ownership
 t-1  0.0113  0.009 
 
 (1.14)  (1.22) 
CEO tenure  0.001*  0.001* 
  (1.8)  (1.77) 
∆ Tobin’s q
 t-1 0.868*** 0.869*** 0.871*** 0.869*** 
    (36.8) (36.1) (30.9) (30.76) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.002 0.028 0.010 0.022 
    (0.31) (1.09) (1.10) (0.11) 
R-squared   0.5482 0.5502 0.5475 0.5497 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of OLS regression analysis of change in Tobin’s q at time t 
regressed on outside CEO and high price-cost margin dummy variable, outside CEO and low 
price-cost margin dummy variable, inside CEO and high price-cost margin dummy variable, and 
other economic and governance control variables for a sample of 461 CEO turnovers.  
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Table 2.7: Robustness Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
constant 0.014***    0.013*** 0.022***   0.012*** 
 
   (4.98) (3.04) (3.66) (2.58) 
 Doutside_highH 0.005* 0.005* 0.005 0.005* 
 
   (1.67) (1.85) (1.63) (1.79) 
Doutside_lowH    0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
   (1.24) (1.45) (1.13) (1.08) 
Dinside_highH    -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 
   (-1.15) (-1.19) (-1.16) (-0.17) 
Ln (total assets)   0.0001 0.0001 
 
  (0.70) (0.15) 
∆ Leveraget-1   -0.002 -0.0025 
 
  (-0.37) (-0.45) 
∆ R&D
 t-1   0.00001 0.00001 
 
  (0.60) (0.62) 
CEO_chair  -0.002  -0.002 
 
 (-1.33)  (-1.29) 
∆ pct_outd
 t-1  0.005  0.005 
 
 (1.31)  (1.33) 
∆ board size
 t-1  -0.0002  -0.0003 
 
 (-1.04)  (-0.88) 
∆ CEO ownership
 t-1  -0.00001  -0.00001 
 
 (-0.08)  (-0.10) 
∆ institution ownership
 t-1  0.004  0.003 
 
 (0.87)  (0.95) 
CEO tenure  0.0001  0.00006 
  (0.67)  (0.62) 
∆ Return
 t-1 0.643*** 0.637*** 0.633*** 0.628*** 
    (15.8) (15.2) (14.1) (13.88) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.003 0.008 0.010 0.024 
    (0.48) (0.36) (0.85) (1.47) 
R-squared   0.4773 0.4728 0.4552 0.4568 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of OLS regression analysis of change in risk-adjusted return at 
time t regressed on outside CEO and high Herfindahl dummy variable, outside CEO and low 
Herfindahl dummy variable, inside CEO and high Herfindahl dummy variable, and other 
economic and governance control variables for a sample of 461 CEO turnovers.  
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